Stockholm Agreement Text

Confidence continued to decline after a series of Houthi attacks on high-level targets far from Hodeidah, including a United Arab Emirates (EMIRATE) base in Mokha (hit by a Houthi missile), a Yemeni government-run military facility in Lahj governorate and sites in Saudi Arabia. At the same time, the Saudi-led coalition has hardened its rhetoric in what many see as preparation for a return to hostility. It must also place its forces in key positions on the Red Sea coast, including Mokha. While not all of these actions constitute violations of the ceasefire agreement (in many cases, Houthi attacks took place outside its geographical scope), they are highly provocative. (v) The original title and the name of the author of the work shall be printed on all copies of the published translation. The licence shall apply only to the publication of the translation in the territory of the Member State in which it was requested. Copies so published may be imported and sold in another country of the Union if one of the national, official or regional languages of that other country is the same language into which the work was translated and if national law provides for such licences in that other country and does not prohibit such importation and sale. If the above conditions do not exist, the import and sale of these copies in an associative country are subject to its national law and conventions. The licence is not transferable by the licensee; The United Nations and the wider international community should urge each side to immediately halt measures to cause the other to move away from the agreement. They must also start implementing the agreement, which above all requires increased cooperation between the Houthis (read more below). The text of the Stockholm Convention was adopted by the Conference of Plenipotentiaries (Stockholm, 22 May 2001) and entered into force on 17 May 2004. The text was subsequently adopted by the Conference of the Parties at its fourth session (Geneva, 4-8).

May 2009), its fifth session (Geneva, 25-29 April 2011), its sixth session (Geneva, 28 April-10 May 2013), its seventh session (Geneva, 4-15 May 2015), its eighth session (Geneva, 24 April-5 May 2017) and its ninth session (Geneva, 29 April -10 May). Achieving this will likely require both a technical component led by Cammaert and a political aspect led by Martin Griffiths, the UN special envoy who negotiated the Stockholm Agreement. Griffiths adhered to a punishable travel plan when he met with senior Houthi leaders, Yemeni government officials and coalition officials and welcomed renewed commitments for the trial. The UN must also redefine the agreed deadlines in Sweden for transfers, set at 21 days after the ceasefire was announced, meaning the deadline expired on 8 January. Even before the hostilities between the parties were taken into account, this period was not realistic from a purely logistical point of view. It will likely be up to Griffiths to get the Houthis and the government to agree on a timetable that recognizes the urgency of the task at hand, but will give Cammaert a decent amount of time to execute it. To regain the lost momentum, the focus for now should be on implementing an agreement on the transfer of genuine Houthis out of ports. You can read our analysis of the agreement here, but its key elements were a prisoner exchange, an agreement on reciprocal transfers from Hodeida – the port, the city and the surrounding area – and the commitment to discuss de-escalation in another frontal city, Taiz. .

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